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Aristotle’s Syllogistic Model 




In the Posterior Analytics (APo), Aristotle defi nes scientifi c knowledge 
as knowledge of the reason why. Knowing why something is the case 
amounts to being able to provide a scientifi c demonstration (apodeixis), 
which consists in a valid syllogistic argument in the mode Barbara. Such 
demonstrations typically deduce the necessity of an attribute belonging 
per se to a certain subject through a middle term that picks out the cause 
of that necessary relationship. Aristotle often illustrates this syllogistic 
model of knowledge with examples drawn from mathematics, which is 
taken to be the paradigmatic demonstrative science (cf. APo I 14, 79a18-
21), presumably because the per se attributes of mathematical fi gures 
(e.g., triangles having angles equal to two rights) can be shown to hold 
of those fi gures necessarily and always.
Notoriously, this is not the only model of demonstration at work in 
Aristotle’s natural treatises (nor in the Aristotelian corpus as a whole, 
for that matter).1 In his methodological introduction to the study of liv-
ing beings in the Parts of Animals (PA) I 1, Aristotle argues that sublu-
nary natural phenomena — which involve change and hold only for the 
most part — can be demonstrated scientifi cally. However, they require 
a different model of demonstration that is special to the natural sciences 
and that is perhaps absent from the Posterior Analytics (see especially 
 1 See Lloyd (1996), 7-37.
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PA I 1, 639a12-15; 640a1-9; 640a33-b3; 642a32-b2).2 In this model, the 
necessity of the relationship between the attribute and the subject is 
conditional, rather than unqualifi ed, and the causal nature of the dem-
onstration is strictly teleological. In addition, unlike the geometric-style 
model of demonstration set out in the Posterior Analytics, which seems 
particularly fi t for dealing with eternal and stable matters of fact, the 
natural science model of demonstration pertains to processes or devel-
opments — that is, to attributes coming to hold of certain animals or their 
parts as the result of the operation of teleology or material necessity.
A third model of demonstration — if we can indeed still speak of 
a model — is provided by the many different, often very loosely for-
mulated, patterns of explanation in Aristotle’s biology. In his biological 
works, Aristotle states explicitly that he aims at generating demon-
strations of some sort,3 but he only rarely identifi es his explanations 
as demonstrations and never formalizes any of them into syllogistic 
form. However, in line with the model of demonstration introduced in 
Parts of Animals Book I, many of the actual explanations provided are 
teleological in nature and pertain to the coming to be, rather than to the 
presence of features. For instance, the program of Aristotle’s Generation 
of Animals (GA) is explicitly introduced as being about specifying the 
causes of the coming into being of living organisms (see especially GA I 
1, 715a1-18 and GA II 1, 731b22-3) and explains, among others, the te-
leological process of embryogenesis. Even the Parts of Animals, in which 
Aristotle claims to take the being of biological kinds as the starting point 
of explanation (see in particular PA I 1, 640a10-33), contains a signifi cant 
number of the so called ‘double-barreled’ explanations. These explana-
tions distinguish explicitly between the material-effi cient causes for the 
coming into being of parts and their differentiations on the one hand, and 
the fi nal causes for their presence on the other hand.4
This plurality of models of demonstration, combined with the dis-
crepancy between the focus on demonstrating eternal matter of facts in 
 2 On the differences and especially the similarities between demonstrations in the 
natural sciences and geometric demonstrations, see Gotthelf (1987), 197-8 and Len-
nox (2001b), 128-31. 
 3 See especially HA I 6, 491a7-13; PA IV 10, 689a9-13; GA II 6, 742b23-36; II 8; and IV 
3, 769a14-25.
 4 See e.g., Aristotle’s explanation of horns in PA III 2, 663b21-35 and of the omentum 
in PA IV 3, 677b22-32. This distinction is also recognized in Ph II 8, 199a7-8 and GA 
V I 1, 778a30-b12; cf. Gotthelf (1987), 237-42.
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the Posterior Analytics and on demonstrating features that come to be in 
the biological treatises, has led some scholars to believe that Aristotle is 
a methodological pluralist regarding demonstration, whose theory and 
practice cannot be reconciled with each other.5 My aim in this paper is 
to soften this picture by showing that, even though the main concern 
of the Posterior Analytics is to offer geometric-style demonstrations of 
‘being’ (i.e., of why certain attributes hold always and of necessity of 
certain subjects), the Posterior Analytics also offers an account of how to 
incorporate time and change into the syllogistic structure of demon-
stration. In this way, the Posterior Analytics can be read as preparing us 
for the natural science model of demonstration. Aristotle may not have 
a monolithic and unifi ed theory of demonstration, but there are also no 
radical breaks between Aristotle’s ‘original’ model of demonstration in 
the Posterior Analytics and the ones employed in the biological works, 
in part because — as I shall argue — that original model itself is more 
fl exible and complex than has traditionally been acknowledged.6
My argument consists of two parts. In section one I discuss a selection 
of texts especially from Book I of the Posterior Analytics, which shows 
that Aristotle from the outset assumes that there are demonstrations of 
processes as well as of timeless states of affairs and that he realizes that 
such demonstrations of processes often require modifi cations from the 
geometric-style model of demonstrations of being. In sections two and 
three I focus on Aristotle’s most informative discussion of demonstra-
tions of processes, which takes place in APo II 12, and show how this 
model converts to and guides Aristotle’s theory and practice of demon-
stration in the biological sciences.
 5 This position is defended most rigorously by Lloyd (1996), 7-37; see especially 5; 
28 (‘... and he certainly makes no comment here whatsoever on the question of 
whether — with those things that come to be — there is demonstration of the type 
he has exemplifi ed from geometry.’) and 32. 
 6 This project is thus in many ways indebted to and a continuation of the work done 
by scholars such as Balme (1987); Bolton (1987; 1997); Charles (1997; 1999); Detel 
(1997; 1999); Gotthelf (1987; 1997); Lennox (2001a; 2001b) and Pellegrin (1986), all 
of whom emphasize the similarities and continuities between Aristotle’s theory 
and practice in the sciences.
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1  Demonstrating processes: 
 some fi rst sketches in the Posterior Analytics
It is commonly assumed7 that Aristotle modeled his syllogistic model 
of demonstration in the Posterior Analytics on the format and methods 
of proof that were being used by the mathematicians of his time, and 
this perhaps explains why the model is particularly well-suited for 
demonstrations of timeless (mathematical) matters of fact. The infl u-
ence and importance of the mathematical model is especially clear in 
the fi rst book of the Posterior Analytics, which draws heavily from math-
ematical examples (a stock example is ‘triangles having angles equal to 
two rights’: APo I 1, 71a19-22; passim). Aristotle also provides some ex-
amples from the natural or biological realm, but they too pertain for the 
most part to attributes that hold always and necessarily of the subjects 
of which they are predicated (e.g., animal holding of human being: APo 
I 4, 73a30-1; I 11, 77a15-19). However, even within the fi rst book, Aris-
totle occasionally throws in an example of a process (e.g., goal-directed 
action in APo I 24, 85b30-5; psychological change in APo I 29, 87b8-13; 
and the screening of the moon by the earth in APo I 31, 87b38-8a5), and, 
more importantly, lays out some distinctions that seem to make room 
for the accommodation of processes within the syllogistic structure of 
demonstrations.
Book I contains three discussions that pertain in particular to dem-
onstrations of processes. The fi rst occurs in APo I 4, where Aristotle 
defi nes four types of per se relations between attribute and subject. The 
fi rst three types involve only matter of facts, but the fourth explicitly 
appeals to processes, that is, to attributes coming to hold of a certain 
subject (APo I 4, 73b10-16):8
In yet another way [we say that] something holds of each thing per se 
when it holds because of itself (di’ hauto), and when it does not hold 
because of itself [we say that it] holds incidentally. For instance, if 
there was lightning while somebody walked (ei badizontos êstrapse), 
[we say that] it holds incidentally: for there was no lightning because 
of the walking, but, as we say, it just happened. But if something holds 
because of itself, [we say that it holds] per se, such as if something died 
 7 See e.g., Barnes (1993), xx; Lennox (2001a), 93-4; and Mendell (2004).
 8 All translations are mine, unless indicated otherwise.
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while being sacrifi ced (ei ti sfattomenon apethane), and on account of the 
sacrifi ce, because of the being sacrifi ced, and not because it just hap-
pened that what was being sacrifi ced died.
The predicative relation exemplifi ed in this passage is not an essential 
one, but rather a causal one that involves an attribute coming to hold 
of a certain subject due to the operation of an external effi cient cause: 
‘died’ comes to hold of a certain animal, because that animal is being 
(i.e., ‘in the process of being’) sacrifi ced. In addition, the predicative 
relation in this fourth type of per se is not always true in the way that 
triangles always have angles equal to two rights. Rather, the predica-
tive relation only obtains whenever the external effi cient cause obtains: 
the predicative relation thus seems to hold only for the most part.9
Next, in APo I 8, Aristotle distinguishes demonstrations of eternals 
from demonstrations of perishables. He explains that the latter only 
hold when the items picked out by the terms in the premises hold (APo 
I 8, 75b21-30) and that therefore our understanding of them is not sim-
ple, but involves knowledge of the ‘when and how’ (APo I 8, 75b26: pote 
kai pôs). He then singles out demonstrations of ‘things that come about 
often’ (APo I 8, 75b33: hai de tôn pollakis ginomenôn), such as an eclipse 
of the moon, and claims that the latter ‘hold always to the extent that 
[eclipses] are such,10 but to the extent that they do not hold always, they 
are particular’ (APo I 8, 75b34-35). According to this chapter, there are 
demonstrations of natural processes that come to be often, even if their 
epistemological status is different from demonstrations of eternals.
And fi nally, in APo I 30, Aristotle claims explicitly that there are no 
demonstrations of what happens by chance, but that there are both 
demonstrations that are concerned with items that are necessary and 
with processes that occur for the most part (APo I 30, 87b19-27; b20-1: hê 
apodeixis thaterou toutôn).
This overview is necessarily perfunctory, but it shows that even 
within the fi rst book of the Posterior Analytics Aristotle distinguishes be-
tween two models of demonstration. The predominant model pertains 
to things that are eternal and necessary, is exemplifi ed by geometrical 
 9 See Ferejohn (1991), 117-23.
10 With Barnes (1993), 134 I follow the text emendation proposed by Verdenius (1981), 
347 and read toiaide instead of toioude in APo I 8, 75b34. 
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examples, and matches the description of demonstration in the theo-
retical sciences in PA I 1, 640a1-9 (and Ph II 9, 200a15-22).
The second model, on the contrary, pertains to things that come to be 
and that hold for the most part, and is illustrated by natural processes 
and goal-directed actions. However, it is not until Book II that Aristotle 
offers us a specifi cation of the syllogistic features of demonstrations of 
developments. The main problem — of how to incorporate change and 
time into the syllogistic structure of demonstrations — is fi rst raised in 
APo II 11 and subsequently receives a full discussion in APo II 12.
In APo II 11 Aristotle introduces his theory of four types of causal ex-
planation into the syllogistic framework of scientifi c demonstration: all 
four types of explanations are brought out through the middle term, 
which picks out the cause of why some attribute belongs to a certain 
subject. The details of Aristotle’s account of the syllogistic structure of 
different types of demonstration in this chapter remain fairly obscure,11 
but it is in the examples Aristotle provides in APo II 11, 94a27-b23 that 
the problem of how to incorporate processes and change into demon-
strations fi rst becomes evident.
Aristotle offers three examples in this chapter. He fi rst gives a math-
ematical example to illustrate demonstrations of a material explanation 
(APo II 11, 94a27-35), which — at least structurally speaking — presents 
a fairly standard case of a demonstration of a timeless state of affairs. 
However, the next two examples presented in APo II 11 explicitly in-
volve change.12 In the ‘historical’ example illustrating demonstrations 
of effi cient explanation in APo II 11, 94a36-b8 Aristotle picks out the fact 
that the Athenians were the fi rst to attack as the cause of why [later] the 
Persian war came upon them.13 The third example in APo II 11, 94b8-26 
pertains to teleological explanation and draws from the realm of human 
activity. There the explanandum (walking after dinner) is revealed to 
11 I present a possible interpretation in Leunissen (2007).
12 Cf. the examples Aristotle provides of things that are both for the sake of some-
thing and of necessity at the end of the chapter (APo II 11, 94b28-36): Aristotle sug-
gests again that there are demonstrations both of what is and of what comes to be 
(APo II 11, 94b31-2: ar’ oun ei einai endechetai, kai ginesthai endechetai). 
13 Explanandum: Why did the Persian war come upon the Athenians? [Why A of C?] 
A = war; B = being the fi rst to attack (aition = effi cient cause); C = Athenians; AaC 
because of B: being warred upon holds of the Athenians because of being the fi rst 
to attack. 
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take place for the sake of its expected (later) end-result and fi nal cause 
(health).14 It is true that these latter two examples hardly look like scien-
tifi c demonstrations at all,15 but presumably Aristotle is less concerned 
with the details of his examples than with the larger patterns that they 
are meant to illustrate in — for his contemporary audience — easy and 
intuitive ways.
That the — correct — incorporation of the temporal relations be-
tween the states of affairs picked out in these two demonstrations is 
important to Aristotle is clear from a short comment he makes at the 
end of the section dealing with the examples (APo II 11, 94b23-6):
Here the processes occur in the opposite order (anapalin) from the 
cases where the causes are according to motion. For in the latter the 
middle term must come to be fi rst, while here C, the ultimate term, 
[must come to be fi rst] and last the for the sake of which.
In this passage, Aristotle contrasts the order of causation in demonstra-
tions of effi cient causal explanations with those of teleological expla-
nations. The middle term in the example of effi cient explanation (i.e., 
being the fi rst to attack) picks out an event that later initiated the war 
against the Athenians. In other words, the predicative relation picked 
out in the conclusion of this effi cient demonstration comes about later 
as a result of an action that was performed earlier by the subject; the 
explanatory effi cient cause thus precedes the explanandum in time.16
However, in the example of teleological explanation, the action 
picked out by the subject term (i.e., walking after dinner, which is the 
explanandum) occurs fi rst; the fi nal cause, health, which is that for the 
sake of which walking takes place, comes about last. In other words, 
the state of affairs picked out as the fi nal cause of the explanandum 
comes about as the end-result of the process of walking, which is an 
effi cient cause that makes the food not fl oating on the surface of the 
stomach (where walking and making the food not fl oat are simultane-
14 Explanandum: Why does he walk? [Why C?] For the sake of health. Why does 
health hold of walking? [Why A of C?] A = being healthy; B = food not fl oating 
(aition = material cause); C = walking after dinner; AaC because of B: being healthy 
holds of walking after dinner because walking makes the food not fl oating, and 
having the food not fl oating is what being healthy is in this context. 
15 See Barnes (1993), 228-9.
16 Schematically, the timeline is as follows: B(aC)t1  A(aC)t2.
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ous processes), and having the food not fl oating is a form of health (the 
condition of having the food not fl oating and of being healthy come 
to be simultaneously in time). Whereas walking thus is for the sake of 
health, health comes about as soon as the process of walking has made 
the food no longer fl oat on the surface of the stomach.17
Aristotle does not explain why this difference between the temporal 
relations picked out in these two demonstrations is important, nor do 
we learn anything about the necessity of the premises involved in dem-
onstrations of processes. The answers to these questions follow in the 
next chapter, to which I shall turn in the sections below.
2  Demonstrations of simultaneous processes 
 in APo II 12 and GA V
Aristotle does not provide a separate introduction to APo II 12.18 The 
discussion of demonstrations of processes seems to follow naturally 
from his discussion of the implementation of the four causes into the 
syllogistic structure of demonstrations and the subsequent account of 
the role of necessity, teleology, and chance in natural processes at the 
end of APo II 11. His main concern in this chapter is to lay out the tem-
poral properties of the terms picked out in demonstrations of processes: 
the examples all pertain to cases where the predication of an attribute to 
a certain subject involves a development or change, which may or may 
not separate cause (picked out by B) and what is caused (represented 
by A’s coming to hold of C, or — what I here somewhat anachronisti-
cally call — the ‘effect’) in continuous time. Such demonstrations of 
processes are formally the same as demonstrations of being, except that 
the terms in the former get tensed (I return to this below).
17 Here, the timeline is: (C=Bmaking)t1  A(aC)t2, where Bhaving=def. A. The example is 
diffi cult to reconstruct, in part because Aristotle appears to change the defi nitions 
of the terms; see Leunissen (2007), 161. For the timeline, cf. Ph II 6, 197b23-5: ‘For 
instance, walking is for the sake of evacuating of the bowels; if this does not come 
to be for the person who walked (ei de mê egeneto badisanti), we say that the walking 
was in vain and that the walk was in vain.’ 
18 My discussion of APo II 12 is greatly indebted to Kupreeva (forthcoming), who of-
fers an excellent analysis of the concepts of necessity and continuity in this chapter 
and suggests the relevance of Aristotle’s treatment of demonstrations of processes 
in APo II 12 for his theory of demonstration in PA I.
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Aristotle analyzes three scenarios of the relationship between cause 
and ‘effect’:
1)  A’s coming to hold of C and the coming to be of B occur at the 
same time such that cause and effect occur simultaneously (APo 
II 12, 95a10-24);
2) A’s coming to hold of C and the coming to be of B occur not at 
the same time, but cause and effect are ‘of the same type’ (APo II 
12, 95a24-5b1 and APo II 12, 95b13-37).
3) A’s coming to hold of C and the coming to be of B occur not at 
the same time, but cause and effect follow each other in a con-
tinuous circle (APo II 12, 95b38-6a7).
The analysis of the second scenario includes a brief investigation of 
the concept of the continuous (APo II 12, 95b1-12); the analysis of the 
third scenario is followed by an excursus on the nature of the predica-
tion of things that come to be for the most part, rather than universally 
(APo II 12, 96a8-19). In the sections below, I shall limit my interpretation 
to the fi rst two models of demonstration and link them to Aristotle’s 
theory and practice in the biological works. The third model, in which 
cause and effect follow each other in a continuous circle (such as in the 
evaporation-cycle), and which possibly forms the basis for Aristotle’s 
treatment of the eternal cycle of animal generation in On Generation and 
Corruption (GC) II 9-11, falls outside the scope of this paper.19
Let me start by giving an account of the fi rst model of demonstrations 
of processes. Aristotle starts his analysis of demonstrations of what lat-
er (i.e., in APo II 12, 95a21-22) turn out to be demonstrations of simulta-
neous processes by pointing out that the cause picked out by the middle 
term is the same both in demonstrations of things that come to be and 
of things that are (APo II 12, 95a10-14).
Demonstrations of things that come to be are thus causally and logi-
cally similar to demonstrations of things that are, but there is one im-
portant difference: while in demonstrations of being the predication is 
not subject to developments over time and holds of necessity, in dem-
onstrations of coming to be the predication does involve a development 
19 For an excellent discussion of these texts, I refer to Kupreeva (forthcoming) and 
Lennox (1985).
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over time, which means that the terms get tensed. Aristotle’s examples 
of an eclipse and ice make clear what he has in mind (APo II 12, 95a14-
21):
For instance, because of what did an eclipse come about (dia ti gegonen 
ekleipsis)? Because the earth came (gegonen) in the middle; and it is 
coming (ginetai) about because [the earth] is coming (ginetai) [in the 
middle], and it will come about (estai) because [the earth] will come 
(estai) in the middle, and there is (esti) [an eclipse] because [the earth] 
is (esti) [in the middle]. What is ice? Assume that it is solidifi ed water. 
Let water be C, solidifi ed A, and the explanatory middle term is B, 
complete cessation of heat. Ice comes to be (ginetai) if B comes to be (gi-
nomenou tou B), it came to be (gegenêtai) if B came to be (gegenêmenou), 
and it will come to be (estai) if B will (esomenou).
The point Aristotle is trying to make here is that in those cases where 
cause and effect occur simultaneously, the tense of the major term (and 
therefore the ‘ontological condition’ of the state of affairs picked out by 
the major term) has to correspond to the tense of the middle term. This 
is because in these cases the processes picked out by the major term 
(i.e., eclipsing or solidifi cation) come to hold of a certain subject at the 
same time as and to the same degree as the states of affairs picked out by 
the middle term come to be (APo II 12, 95a22-4): ‘Eclipsing’ of the moon 
happens simultaneously with the earth moving in the middle between 
the sun and the moon; solidifi cation of water (or: the coming to be of 
ice) happens simultaneously with the complete cessation of heat.20
Interestingly, both the examples Aristotle offers in this section in-
volve natural phenomena, but they are of the kind that happen entirely 
of material necessity and not for the sake of something. In addition, the 
attributes ‘being eclipsed’ and ‘solidifi ed’ come to hold of their subjects 
‘moon’ respectively ‘water’, not in virtue of themselves, but in virtue of 
being acted upon by an external effi cient cause (note that the examples 
are not unlike the ‘dying in virtue of being sacrifi ced’ example used in 
APo I 4 for the illustration of the causal notion of per se): the position of 
20 Schematically, we get:
  A = eclipse [‘eclipsing’]    A = solidifi ed
  B = earth coming in the middle  B = complete cessation of heat
  C = moon    C = water
 The coming to be of A(aC) sim coming to be of B(aC).
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the earth determines whether or not and to what extent ‘being eclipsed’ 
holds of the moon, and the external heat determines whether or not and 
to what extent solidifi cation holds of water.
In the biological works, explanations that pick out external effi cient 
causes that occur simultaneously with their effects are relatively rare 
(they may be more common in the Meteorology, which is concerned 
with the changes that affect the four sublunary elements),21 but they oc-
cur frequently in Generation of Animals Book V.22 In this book, Aristotle 
discusses a very specifi c group of attributes or pathêmata ‘by which the 
parts of animals differ’, such as differences in eye-color, hair-structure, 
and pitch of voice, that all come to be due to changes occurring during 
the development of the animal after its birth (GA V 1, 778a16-28). In 
many cases, those changes are due to the material nature of the animal 
itself,23 but sometimes they occur under the infl uence of the operation 
of external material-effi cient causes, such as the (changing) tempera-
ture of the animal’s environment24 or diseases.25 When the natural heat 
of the animal is affected, either from the outside through changes in 
the environment, or from the inside through a disease, some of its at-
tributes undergo notable changes. And as Aristotle points out, those 
changes correlate and happen simultaneously with the changes in heat. 
For instance, what causes hair to turn grey in human beings (besides 
old age) is the infl uence of disease: disease is a (temporary) defi ciency 
in natural heat, which makes the body go cold and renders it incapable 
of concocting the moisture in hair, and this causes the hair to ‘mould’ 
and turn white. Once the disease is gone, however, and the internal 
heat restored, the hair may change back into its normal color (GA V 4, 
784b26-32): as Aristotle points out, the attributes change together with 
(GA V 4, 784b31: ta pathê summetaballousin) the changes in the level of 
bodily heat, which in its turn is determined by the presence or absence 
21 See, e.g., the explanations of snow and hoar-frost in Mete I 11, 347b23-4; the expla-
nation of the moistness of the earth as correlating with (metaballousin) the coming 
into being and perishing of rivers in Mete I 14, 351a19-21; and the explanation of 
earthquakes in Mete II 8, 365b21-3 and 368a7-8.
22 For an overall interpretation of GA V, see Leunissen & Gotthelf (in preparation).
23 For examples, see GA V 1, 779b2; V 3, 784a4-5; V 6, 785b16-6a2 and V 6, 786a2-4. 
24 For examples, see GA V 2, 781a33-4; V 3, 782b32-3a1; V 3, 783a11-32; V 3, 784a12-20; 
V 6, 786a30-4; and V 7, 788a16-20.
25 See e.g., GA V 1, 780a14-21 and V 4, 784a25-30.
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of disease. Similarly, our hearing deteriorates at the same time as we 
yawn or breath out, because the organ of hearing and the organ con-
cerned with breathing are spatially connected, and the organ of hearing 
‘is being shaken and moved at the same time as the [other] organ moves 
the air’ (GA V 2, 781a30-4; 32-3: seiesthai kai kineisthai hama kinountos tou 
organou to neuma).
Unusual as many of these explanations in Generation of Animals V 
may be, they seem perfectly in line and consistent with the fi rst model 
of demonstrations of processes outlined in APo II 12. This is evidenced 
by Aristotle’s concern in Generation of Animals V with explicating not 
just the causes of the coming to be of certain attributes, but also with 
pointing out their simultaneous occurrence with the occurrence of their 
causes (cf. Aristotle’s frequent use of the verb summetaballô in these 
contexts).26 This model, then, works well for the explanation of certain 
phenomena that are due to material-effi cient causation (i.e., where the 
affection that needs to be explained occurs simultaneously with the op-
eration of the effi cient cause on the subject), but it may not work as well 
for the explanation of teleological phenomena. Teleological processes 
typically involve the realization of a potential for form,27 and the end 
that constitutes the fi nal cause of that process comes to be last: cause 
(i.e., the presence of a potential for form in some subject) and effect (i.e., 
the realization of that form in that subject) do not occur simultaneously 
in teleological processes, but are separated in time. For a model that fi ts 
teleological explanation better, and which was possibly the template 
for the account of demonstration in Parts of Animals I, we need to turn 
to Aristotle’s discussion of the second scenario in the Posterior Analytics, 
described in APo II 12, 95a24-95b1 and 95b13-b37.
3  Demonstrations of same-type processes in 
 APo II 12, PA I-II, and GA II
The second scenario of demonstration of processes Aristotle discusses 
involves cases where cause and effect do not occur simultaneously, 
but occur or come to be at different instances in a continuous time-se-
26 See GA V 3, 783a17 and 783a36-7; GA V 7, 787b30; 788a10-12; and 788a16-18.
27 I here follow the interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology as introduced by Gotthelf 
(1976) and (1987).
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quence. Aristotle asks whether we can say that one process is the cause 
of another. The answer appears to be yes (APo II 12, 95a25: hôsper dokei 
hêmin): it is possible to explain something that is coming to be by refer-
ence to something else that was coming to be earlier, and similarly for 
processes taking place in the future or in the past. In the subsequent 
elucidation of his answer, Aristotle makes the following three claims 
about the syllogistic structure of such demonstrations:
First, in cases where cause and effect are separated in time and where 
the two follow each other linearly (i.e., the cause occurs fi rst, then the 
effect) rather than in a continuous cycle, ‘the syllogism starts from what 
has happened later’ (APo II 12, 95a27-8). This means that the inferences 
involved in the construction of demonstrations of linear processes must 
start from the effects and work back to their necessary antecedent causes.28 
The endpoint of the causal process is thus the starting point of the syl-
logism. As Aristotle points out, there can be no inference in the other 
direction, which would be from what is earlier to what is later (APo II 
12, 95a30-1). The reason is that, regardless of what the exact nature of 
time is, given a particular sequence of processes that take place in time 
there will always be a moment when the cause has occurred but not 
yet its effect, such that at that intermediate time inferences from cause 
to effect will be false (APo II 12, 95a31-5; 95a39-b1). For the syllogistic 
model of demonstrations of such phenomena this analysis entails that 
the cause picked out by the middle term must have occurred chrono-
logically earlier than the states of affairs picked out in the conclusion 
that is to be demonstrated. (As Aristotle points out in Ph II 9, 200a15-
22, demonstrations of sublunary, linear natural phenomena are in this 
respect dissimilar to demonstrations of mathematical objects which do 
not involve changes over time: although the inferences in both domains 
are one-directional, in mathematics one needs to start with the prior and 
work towards the posterior in order for the inference to be valid.)29
Second, Aristotle explains that in these cases the middle term, which 
picks out the cause, must be ‘homogonos’ with (i.e., ‘of the same type 
as’; see APo II 12, 95a36-8) its effect, which means that the middle term 
must express the same tense as is expressed in the extreme terms, spe-
cifi cally as is expressed in the major term. We can thus only provide 
demonstrations of a sequence of processes in which all processes are of 
28 Cf. Wieland (1972), 232.
29 For this interpretation, cf. Gotthelf (1987), 197-8.
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the same type, i.e., they must all be either past, future, or present hap-
penings. There are no inferences from past to future processes, because 
there is no middle term that can be of the same type as both extremes 
(APo II 12, 95a38-9).
Third, Aristotle states that the middle term and the major term of 
demonstrations involving a series of consecutive processes must form 
immediate premises (APo II 12, 95b13-15; cf. APo II 12, 95b24-5). Aristot-
le’s explanation of this requirement is somewhat obscure, but he seems 
to say that in a given causal chain in which cause and effect occur con-
secutively and not simultaneously (e.g., the occurrence of A at t1 causes 
occurrence of C at t2, and then C causes the occurrence of D at t3), we 
can fi nd the explanatory middle term by drawing inferences from what 
occurs later to what necessarily had to occur earlier. The starting point 
of such inferences is always the later event, which is the closest to the 
present, and from there we are supposed to work our way back to the 
necessary prerequisites of this later process that we know has come 
about. In other words, Aristotle states that we can infer the (earlier) oc-
currence of A from the (later) occurrence of D through C: given that A 
is an immediately necessary precondition for the occurrence of C, and 
C is immediately necessary for D, we are allowed to draw the inference 
that if D has come about A must have come about (earlier), and that the 
cause is C (APo II 12, 95b19-20). Aristotle illustrates this with a concrete 
example (APo II 12, 95b31-7):
And it is this way with regard to concrete things: if a house has come 
to be, it is necessary that stones have been cut and have come to be 
(ei gegonen oikia, anagkê tetmêsthai lithous kai gegonenai). Why is this? 
Because it is necessary that a foundation has come to be, if also a house 
has come to be. If a foundation, then it is necessary that earlier stones 
have come to be. Again, if there will be a house, in the same way there 
will have to be stones earlier. And it is similarly brought out through 
the middle term: for there will be a foundation earlier (estai gar theme-
lios proteron).
From the coming to be of a house (which is what has come to be later 
and is closest to the present, and forms therefore the starting point of 
the inference), we can infer the necessity of stones having come to be 
earlier, because a foundation is a necessary condition for the coming to 
be of a house, and stones are a necessary condition for the coming to 
be of a foundation. The earlier occurrence of stones is thus brought out 
through the middle term, which is the earlier presence of a foundation. 
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Again, it does not make a difference whether the inference pertains to 
the past, present, or future: as long as the middle term is homogenous 
to the extremes, the inference is valid. (I take it that this example illus-
trates the mode of inference that is appropriate with regard to consecu-
tive causal chains and not necessarily a demonstration itself.)
Taking these three points together, it appears that Aristotle in this 
section characterizes demonstrations concerning linear sequences of 
(same-type) causes and effects as involving one-directional inferences 
from the chronologically posterior to the prior, in which the necessi-
ty of the occurrence of the prior is derived from the occurrence of the 
posterior. The middle term in such demonstrations ought to pick out 
a cause that constitutes an immediately necessary prerequisite for the 
effect (i.e., the coming to hold of an attribute of a subject) that has come 
about.
This characterization of the second model of demonstration is im-
portant for the following three reasons. First, it shows that Aristotle at 
least had a modal notion of conditional necessity30 when he wrote the 
Posterior Analytics. Second, I believe that the characterization of this 
second model provides the conceptual foundations for the model of 
demonstration in the natural sciences that Aristotle develops in Parts of 
Animals Book I, for demonstrations of the natural kind follow the same 
inference scheme. The innovation of the account in the Parts of Animals 
is that Aristotle provides a teleological interpretation of the consecu-
tive causal chain, which was absent in the Posterior Analytics. Third, it 
explains Aristotle’s methodological preoccupation with determining 
what process or development comes to be before what in natural causal 
sequences. Here it appears that Aristotle uses chronological priority as 
a way to detect causal priority — a method that surfaces in a couple of 
passages in Parts of Animals Books I-II, but which is particularly promi-
nent in Generation of Animals Book II. In the sections below, I shall spec-
ify each of these claims.
Aristotle’s modal notion of conditional necessity
Let me start with my fi rst claim that Aristotle’s discussion of demon-
strations of same-type processes in APo II 12 shows that he had already 
30 On Aristotle’s modal use of necessity and its possible presence in the Posterior 
Analytics, see Kupreeva (forthcoming).
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developed a modal notion of conditional necessity in the Posterior Ana-
lytics (perhaps before developing a causal one). Traditionally, scholars 
have contested precisely this claim,31 but I believe that they do so only 
because they do not distinguish between what Kupreeva calls a modal 
and a causal use of Aristotle’s notion of necessity.
Usually, and especially when discussing the types of causes opera-
tive in nature, Aristotle refers to necessity to indicate a particular type 
of causality. This is the causal use of necessity: it refers to the necessity 
of materials acting to their own material nature in a way that is either 
dependent or independent of some pre-existing internal potential for 
form that needs to be realized (i.e. conditional versus material neces-
sity). For instance, in Ph II 9, 199b34-200a15, Aristotle explicates how 
necessity operates in natural things that are for the sake of something32 
and concludes, without rejecting the necessity of material natures al-
together, that in natural generation, the necessity that is operative is 
not unqualifi ed, material necessity as his predecessors had thought, but 
rather conditional necessity (Ph II 9, 200a13: ex hupotheseôs de to anag-
kaion).
In other contexts, however, and in particular when discussing the 
type of demonstration required in the natural sciences as opposed to 
that required in the other theoretical sciences (such as in PA I 1, 639b29-
40a9, Ph II 9, 200a15-30, and GC II 11, 337b14-25), Aristotle uses necessi-
ty to refer to a particular type of modal relationship that holds between 
two either consecutive or simultaneous states of affairs in a continuous 
causal sequence. This is what Kupreeva has termed the modal use of ne-
cessity:33 it is concerned with the nature of causal inferences and with the 
question of whether the cause necessitates its effect always and neces-
sarily, or only for the most part and contingently (i.e. unqualifi ed neces-
sity versus material or conditional necessity).
Let me give a concrete example of these uses. Suppose (as we did 
in APo II 12, 95a16-21) that ice is the solidifi cation of water due to a 
31 See e.g., Lennox (2001a), xxii and 102.
32 Cf. Ph II 8, 198b11-12: epeita peri tou anagkaiou, pôs echei en tois phusikois. See Cooper 
(1987), 262.
33 Note that Kupreeva’s observation that Aristotle sometimes uses (his familiar no-
tions of) necessity in a modal way (i.e. in order to identify the type of necessity that 
obtains between cause and effect in linear causal sequences) does not require us 
to attribute a (contemporary) notion of ‘modal necessity’ to Aristotle, which is a 
move I would resist. 
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complete cessation of heat. For the natural scientist, there are (at least) 
two questions here that are relevant and proper to his science. First, 
we need to establish whether the phenomenon of ice-formation is due 
to teleology or rather to material necessity. The answer to this ques-
tion will identify the nature of the causality that underlies processes of 
ice-formation. Here the answer is ‘material necessity’, used in a causal 
sense. Second, and this question is particularly important if we want 
to provide demonstrations of why ice comes about and get the causal 
inference right, we need to establish whether, when there is a complete 
cessation of heat, we can be sure that there will always, without ex-
ception, be a solidifi cation of water. In other words, is it the case that 
the relation between ‘complete cessation of heat’ and ‘solidifi cation of 
water’ is necessary in an unqualifi ed way, or is it rather necessary in 
a qualifi ed way? If the relation is one of unqualifi ed necessity, we can 
infer the presence of the effect from the current presence of the cause 
(for the cause will always, without exception, necessitate its effect). If 
the relation is one of necessity in a qualifi ed way, then we cannot draw 
any causal inference from cause to effect (for it is not absolutely neces-
sary that when the cause occurs, the effect occurs as well), but only 
from effect to cause (given that the effect has occurred, it is absolutely 
necessary that the cause has occurred as well). Here the answer seems 
to be that the relation between cause and effect is not one of unquali-
fi ed necessity (as we shall see shortly, sublunary natural processes that 
are non-cyclical never involve relations of unqualifi ed necessity), but 
rather one of material necessity in a modal sense.
Now, it is clear that in APo II 12 Aristotle is not particularly interested 
in identifying the mode of causality that is, for instance, responsible for 
the coming to be of a house. He nowhere qualifi es the sequence from 
stones to foundations to a house as teleological, although I take it that 
Aristotle usually takes this sequence to be a proper and paradigmatic 
case of an (artifi cial) teleological causal chain (cf. Ph II 9, 200a24-9; PA 
II 1, 646a27-8; and PA III 5, 668a13-24). His main concern is with speci-
fying what kind of causal inferences we are allowed to draw in cases 
where A is the cause of B, but where B does not occur at the same time 
as A but instead occurs later. His answer is that the inference is to start 
with what happens later: the prior occurrence of A can be said to be 
necessary, given the later occurrence of B and A being a necessary pre-
requisite for B. Aristotle gives a similar account of the direction causal 
inferences can take depending on whether the necessity involved in 
such sequences is ‘conditional’ or ‘unqualifi ed’ in On Generation and 
Corruption book II (GC II 11, 337b14-25):
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If it is the case that the coming to be of something earlier is necessary 
if a later thing is to be (ei dê to proteron anagkê genesthai, ei to husteron 
estai), e.g., if a house, then foundations, and if that [i.e., foundations], 
then clay, does it follow that if there have come to be foundations a 
house, too, must necessarily come to be? Or can we not yet say this, 
unless it is necessary without qualifi cation (anagkê haplôs) that the lat-
ter itself come to be? If that is the case, then it is necessary that also 
the house comes to be when the foundation has come to be: for such 
was the relation of the earlier to the later, namely that if that one is to 
be, necessarily the other one will be fi rst. If, accordingly, it is necessary 
for the later one to come to be, it is necessary also for the earlier one; 
and if the earlier one comes to be, it is accordingly necessary for the 
later one [to come to be too] — but not because of the earlier one, but 
because it was assumed that it was necessary that it would exist. So 
in those cases where it is necessary for the later one to exist, there is 
conversion, and it is always necessary, if the earlier has come to be, 
that the later should also come to be.
The example Aristotle uses to illustrate two kinds of causal inferences, 
one starting from the prior, the other from the posterior, is the same 
as in APo II 12: the coming to be of the prior (i.e., the foundations) is 
necessary if the posterior (i.e., the house) is to be, but it is not the case 
that once the prior has come to be, the posterior will necessarily come 
to be as well (i.e., the presence of foundations does not guarantee the 
presence of the house). Only if the necessity between the processes in 
a process of coming to be is absolute, for instance, when we posit that 
the relationship between foundations and a house is necessary ‘without 
qualifi cation’, would the causal inference ‘if there are foundations, the 
house will be as well’ be valid. As Aristotle points out, only in the latter 
cases does the inference convert.
Following the On Generation and Corruption Book II passage quoted 
above, Aristotle links these different types of causal inferences to the 
different types of processes that occur in the natural world: absolutely 
necessary relations between the prior and the posterior hold only of 
things that are eternal and/or are subjected to eternal cyclical processes 
(such as the movement of the heavens, the evaporation-cycle, and the 
cycle of air; see GC II 11, 337b30-8a18), whereas conditionally neces-
sary relations pertain to the generation of animals, which is a sublu-
nary natural process that is rectilinear and that concerns beings whose 
substances are perishable (GC II 11, 338b6-11; GC II 11, 338b9-11: ‘For 
it is not necessary if your father came to be, that you come to be, but 
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if you came to be, then he came to be’). In short, for natural processes 
that are linear and not eternal the prior in a consecutive causal chain 
necessitates the posterior only for the most part (by whatever type of 
causality), which means that the necessity between those two processes 
is never unqualifi ed and does not convert (i.e., only if B, then necessar-
ily A). Again, Aristotle is not concerned here with identifying the type 
of causality that is operative in various kinds of natural processes,34 but 
only with the type of necessity that holds between the prior and the 
posterior in such causal chains, regardless of whether the posterior is 
the end that constitutes the fi nal cause of that process or just any later 
event within a causal sequence.
In sum, the modal notion of conditional necessity employed in GC II 
11 and APo II 12 is the same. What the account in GC II 11 adds to the 
picture is how this model of inferences translates to the explanation of 
actual natural processes that are linear and non-eternal, but without 
yet specifying the causal ‘color’ of the causal chain at stake. An explicit 
teleological interpretation of this causal chain is offered only where Ar-
istotle differentiates the various causal powers at work in nature, such 
as for instance in Physics book II (specifi cally: in Ph II 9, 199b34-200a30; 
200a24-29):
Such that if there will be a house, it is necessary that these things come 
to be or are present or exist (hôst’ ei estai oikia, anagkê tauta genesthai ê 
huparchein), or in general the matter that is for the sake of something, 
such as bricks and stones, if it is a house. However, it is not because of 
these that there is an end, except as the matter, nor will it be because 
of these. However, in general without these things being present there 
will not be a house or a saw, in the fi rst case if there are no stones, in 
the second if there is no iron. (Cf. PA I 1, 640a4-5 and 642a7-12).
In this passage, Aristotle takes the outcome of a consecutive causal 
chain to be the end and fi nal cause of that whole process, and qualifi es 
the preceding stages as conditionally necessary prerequisites that have 
to be present fi rst (and be changed in certain ways) if the end is to be re-
34 Cf. Lennox (2001a), 138 about GC II 11, 338b11-12: ‘The argument is formulated 
in the language of ‘hypothetical’ necessity, but it is not an example which illus-
trates hypothetical necessity at all.’ Under my interpretation, Aristotle is talking 
about conditional necessity in a modal sense here, and not — as Lennox points out 
— about conditional necessity in a causal sense.
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alized. This is the causal notion of conditional necessity, which is indeed 
absent from the Posterior Analytics, but which is conceptually consistent 
with its modal counterpart that Aristotle analyzes in APo II 12.
The second model of APo II 12 as a blueprint for Aristotle’s 
model of demonstration in the natural sciences
I submit that Aristotle’s analysis of demonstrations involving causal 
chains in which the cause and effect do not occur simultaneously in 
APo II 12 forms the immediate model for what demonstrations in the 
natural sciences should look like.35
The crucial text in the Parts of Animals is the following (PA I 1, 639b29-
40a9):
However, the mode of demonstration and of necessity is different (ho 
tropos tês apodeixeôs kai tês anagkês heteros) in the natural and the theo-
retical sciences. These have been discussed elsewhere. For the starting 
point is in some [i.e., the theoretical sciences] what is, but in others 
[i.e., the natural sciences] what will be. For: ‘since health or man is 
such, it is necessary that this is or comes to be’ (epei gar toionde estin hê 
hugieia ê ho anthrôpos, anagkê tod’ einai ê genesthai), but not ‘since this 
is or has come to be, that of necessity is or will be.’ Nor is it possible 
to connect the necessity in such a demonstration to eternity, so as to 
say, ‘since this is, therefore that is’. These matters too have been deter-
mined elsewhere, namely in what sorts of things [this kind of neces-
sity] is present, what kind of processes convert and because of what 
cause.
The distinction Aristotle explicates between demonstrations in the nat-
ural sciences (i.e., those that pertain to generated natural things)36 and 
35 Pace Lloyd (1996), 32.
36 This divide between the natural sciences that are concerned with generation and 
the [other] theoretical sciences that are concerned with eternal, non-generated 
things is created in the preceding passage (PA I 1, 639b22-2). In this passage, Ar-
istotle differentiates the domains of the natural world according to the type of 
necessity that pertains to it, and thereby introduces a special type of necessity into 
the domain of generated natural beings. While unqualifi ed necessity holds of the 
eternal, natural realm of the heavenly bodies, among the generated natural beings 
there is also a kind of necessity present, namely conditional necessity (this is what 
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demonstrations in the theoretical sciences pertains, fi rst, to the direction 
of the inference, and, second, to the modal type of necessity picked out 
in the demonstration. Since (teleological) demonstrations in the natu-
ral sciences pertain to causal sequences in which cause and effect are 
separated in time, and since ‘we cannot connect the necessity in such a 
demonstration to eternity’ (which means that Aristotle must be exclud-
ing the heavenly and circular natural phenomena here), we can only 
draw inferences from what has already come to be to its antecedent 
causes. The starting point for demonstrations in the natural sciences37 
is thus the posterior, which is usually the realized end, from which its 
necessary antecedents can be deduced: the inference in natural dem-
onstrations is one-directional from end to the preconditions of the end, 
and the necessity picked out in such teleological demonstrations is con-
ditional necessity (cf. Aristotle’s example of such a demonstration in PA 
I 1, 642a32-b2). For the objects of the theoretical sciences, on the other 
hand, which do not involve generation, the starting point of the infer-
ence is the prior, from which one can derive the posterior, because the 
relation between the two is absolutely necessary or necessary ‘in an 
unqualifi ed way’.
In other words, I believe that the only addition Aristotle makes in 
the Parts of Animals to his model of demonstration involving sequences 
of same-type causes and effects that he developed in APo II 12 is a te-
leological interpretation of this causal sequence: since demonstrations 
in the natural sciences by defi nition apply to natural phenomena, and 
since natural phenomena are (at least for the most part) teleological, the 
causal sequences at stake are (again, at least for the most part) going 
to be teleological. The end that constitutes the fi nal cause becomes the 
starting point of the demonstration, and the middle term will have to 
I take to be the most natural reading of the particle kai in PA I 1, 639b23). See also 
Lennox (2001b), 128-9.
37 Normally, Aristotle depicts natural science as being itself one of the theoretical 
sciences (see Lennox 2001b, 129; Metaph E 1, 1025b18-6a23 and PA I 1, 641b11), 
and distinguishes the theoretical sciences from the practical and productive ones. 
In this passage, however, Aristotle singles out that part of the science of being 
that is concerned with generated things from that which is concerned with eternal 
things. I believe that this reading is most consistent with the preceding distinctions 
between the natural generated beings on the one hand and the eternal (natural) 
beings on the other. Natural science thus has to be understood in the narrow sense 
of the science that deals with natural beings whose substances are perishable. For 
alternative interpretations, see Lloyd (1996), 29, and Johnson (2005), 162-3.
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pick out the conditionally necessary antecedents. The mode of infer-
ence itself, however, remains the same as the one outlined in APo II 12 
(i.e., backwards from the posterior to the prior), since this mode applies 
to all causal chains in which cause and effect come to be consecutively 
in a non-circular way.
Chronological order as a means to track causal order in the biological works
Third, since many if not most sublunary natural phenomena and their 
properties come to be as a result of linear teleological developments, 
demonstrations of their coming to be face the extra challenge of not 
only picking out the primary causal factor through the middle term, 
but also of specifying the actual sequence and the timing of the processes 
to be picked out in the demonstrative syllogism.38 In fact, as Aristotle 
indicates in APo II 12, it is only through reconstructing the exact order 
of processes that we are able to identify the primary causal factor and 
the immediate premises (involving causal per se relations) from which 
demonstrations of processes could possibly be constructed.39
This concern for specifying the order and timing of natural processes 
for the sake of providing (teleological) explanations of these processes 
is also evidenced in Aristotle’s biological works: in his Parts of Animals, 
Aristotle specifi es what he means by ‘order in generation’ and how it 
relates to ‘order in being’, and in his Generation of Animals, he appears 
both to literally follow this ‘order in generation’ at the level of exposi-
tion and to explicitly use order in generation as a means to identify 
different kinds of causal roles.
The most explicit discussion of what Aristotle means by ‘order in 
generation’ occurs in PA II 1. There Aristotle lays out the three differ-
ent kinds of composition from which all animals and their parts are 
constituted. The fi rst constitution consists of the four elements (or per-
haps more specifi cally their material potentials), the second consists of 
the uniform parts, and the third and last consists of the non-uniform 
parts. The ordering appears to be chronological, following the actual 
38 Cf. Gotthelf (1987), 237-8. See perhaps also: Ph II 7, 198a34-5): ‘For with regard to 
generation it is mostly in this way that people investigate into the explanations 
— ‘what comes to be after what?’, and ‘what was the fi rst to act or to undergo?’, 
and in this way at each step of the series.’ 
39 Cf. Charles (2000), 198-204.
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order of coming to be, for Aristotle immediately points out that ‘order 
in generation’ is the opposite from ‘order in substantial being’ or ‘order 
in nature’ (PA II 1, 646a24-b2). Whereas order in being is explained to 
pertain to priority relations in nature and in defi nition, the order in gen-
eration is depicted as a chronological order (PA II 1, 646a35: tôi chronôi) 
that tracks what comes to be from what origin and into what end, thus 
revealing the effi cient and fi nal causes of the natural, teleological pro-
cess (PA II 1, 646a30-5):40
For each thing that comes into being is generated from something and 
into something, namely from an origin to an origin, from a fi rst mover 
and what already has some nature to some shape or whatever other 
end: for a human being generates a human being, and a plant a plant, 
from the underlying matter of each.
From this Aristotle concludes that matter and generation are neces-
sarily prior in time, but that substantial being and shape are prior in 
defi nition. In his application of these distinctions to his analysis of the 
three material compositions, Aristotle then seems to suggest that the 
observed chronological order of the generation of parts can be used 
as an indication (but not necessarily anything stronger than that) of the 
causal relation between parts (PA II 1, 646b5-10):
Such that the matter of the elements is necessarily for the sake of the 
uniform parts (hôste tên men tôn stoicheiôn hulên anagkaion einai tôn ho-
moiomerôn heneken). For the latter are later in generation than the for-
40 This distinction builds on Aristotle’s earlier discussion of the relation between 
generation and being in PA I 1, 640a10-b4. There he argued that the chrono-
logical order of the coming to be of the parts of an animal ought always to be 
explained by reference to the being of that animal, because generation is for 
the sake of being, and not the other way around, as Empedocles thought.
  Aristotle points to two factors that ensure this teleological relation between 
generation and being: fi rst, the potential for form that is already present in the 
seed at the very beginning of the development, and second, the producer who is 
prior — not only in defi nition, but also in time — to the product. In other words, 
the process of sexual reproduction, which is a paradigmatic case of natural teleol-
ogy, starts (in a chronological sense) with the presence of a producer who already 
possesses the form in a realized form, who then by means of his seed transmits a 
potential for the realization of the same form into the female menses; the process 
ends in time with the completed realization of the form, which constitutes the 
animal’s fi nal cause, and which is prior in defi nition and in nature.
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mer, and the non-uniform parts [are later in generation than] them 
[i.e., the uniform parts]: for those [i.e., the non-uniform parts] already 
have the end and the limit, having received a constitution of the third 
number, just as often happens when generations are completed.
In this passage, Aristotle applies his earlier suggestion (made in PA II 
1, 646a25-6) about the correlation between being last in generation and 
being fi rst in nature: since the non-uniform parts are the last to come 
to be, one may conclude (I take this to be the force of the hôste in PA II 
1, 646b5) that they are that for the sake of which the elements and the 
uniform parts come to be.41
In the Generation of Animals, Aristotle follows this ‘order of genera-
tion’ as an ordering principle of his discussion of (the parts and effi cient 
causes of) animal reproduction (cf. GA I 2, 716a2-4; GA II 1, 733a32-3; 
and GA IV 8, 776b3-4). Schematically, the account starts by identify-
ing the fi rst principles of sexual generation, i.e., the male and the fe-
male (GA I 1-2); then it discusses the reproductive organs (GA I 3-23); 
gives a causal explanation of embryological development (GA II-III); 
explains the mechanisms of sexual differentiation and heredity (GA IV 
1-3); discusses phenomena surrounding birth (GA IV 4-10); and fi nally 
discusses those differences of the more and the less that arise in animal 
parts in the later development of the animal, after its birth (Generation 
of Animals V). Aristotle’s account thus tracks animal generation from its 
fi rst effi cient causes to the attributes of the fully developed animal.
However, it is in Aristotle’s discussion of embryogenesis in Genera-
tion of Animals Book II that his concern for detecting the right order of 
processes in generation is most apparent. The fi rst few chapters deal 
with the question of whether it is the heart that is the source of the other 
41 I am tempted to read Aristotle’s initial analysis of the city in the Politics as a similar 
application of this ‘methodological principle’ of laying out the chronological order 
of the coming to be of parts in order to detect the causal relations between them. 
For, in Pol I 1, Aristotle proposes that, in order to determine in what ways different 
kinds of rule differ from one another, one ought to analyze the whole city into its 
basic elements (Pol I 1, 1252a18-23), but then carries out this constitutive analysis 
in Pol I 2 by a quasi-etiological account (Pol I 2, 1252a24-6) of how the city devel-
oped naturally out of simpler communities and of how this city constitutes their 
natural end. Again, the suggestion is that the genetic account (whether or not it is 
to be taken literally) gives us a clearer and better view of the subject under inves-
tigation (Pol I 2, 1252a24-6).
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parts of animals, and if so, whether it generates them simultaneously or 
in succession (GA II 1, 734a16-22):
Concerning the other parts — how [does the heart make those]? For 
either all parts, such as the heart, lung, liver, eye, and each of the other 
ones, come to be simultaneously (hama), or [they come to be] in suc-
cession (ephexês), just as in the words ascribed to Orpheus: for there he 
said that a living being comes to be in the same way as the weaving of 
a net. That they [do] not [come to be] at the same time is clear also to 
perception: for some of the parts seem already to be present in there, 
whereas others do not.
In this passage, Aristotle tries to determine whether — in the language 
familiar from the Posterior Analytics — the process of the generation 
of animal parts is a simultaneous or a consecutive causal chain. Empiri-
cal evidence speaks in favor of the latter, and Aristotle concludes that 
parts come into being one after another (GA II 1, 734a25: tode meta tode; 
GA II 1, 734a25-33). In the later chapters, he argues that the generation 
of the heart, which is the fi rst principle of growth of the animal (GA II 
4, 740b2-4; cf. PA III 4, 666a18-21), is followed by the formation of fi rst 
the internal and then the external parts (GA II 4, 739b34-40a23; GA II 6, 
741a25-6).
In GA II 6, Aristotle lays out a detailed method for determining the 
order in which the parts of animals develop, which cannot always be 
observed (bigger parts often appear earlier even though they started 
developing later: GA II 6, 741b26-7) and is something that ‘is not easy’ 
to determine (GA II 6, 742b6-7 and GA II 6, 742b9-10). Criticizing some 
of the ancient natural philosophers for not being experienced enough 
with this matter, Aristotle again points out that there are differences in 
priority in generation and in substantial being (GA II 6, 742a16-25):
Some of the ancient natural philosophers tried to say which part comes 
into being after which (ti meta ti gignetai tôn moriôn), but they were not 
too experienced with what happens. For among the parts, just as with 
regard to other things, one naturally comes to be prior to the other. But 
‘prior’ is said in many ways: for ‘that for the sake of which’ and ‘that 
which is for the sake of something’ are different, and while of the two 
the latter is prior in generation (to men têi genesei proteron), the former 
[is prior] in substantial being (to de têi ousiai). And ‘that which is for 
the sake of something’ also admits of two differences: for the one is 
the origin of movement and the other is that which ‘that for the sake 
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of which’ makes use of. I mean for instance that which produces and 
that which is instrumental to the producer.
In conformity with his discussion of priority-relations in the Parts of 
Animals, Aristotle here identifi es the end (which constitutes the fi nal 
cause of something) as being prior in defi nition, whereas that which is 
for the sake of the end (at least in the sense of that which is the source 
or the producer of the end) as being prior in generation. Based on this 
distinction, Aristotle then continues to identify three types of biological 
parts whose place in the order of coming to be is tied closely to their 
causal role. First, there are parts that are a source of other parts: they are 
the principle of motion and generation and therefore necessarily have 
to come to be fi rst. Second, there are parts that are ‘that for the sake of 
which’ and that make use of other parts: they come to be after the fi rst 
type of parts has come into being. Finally, there are parts that are for 
the sake of something and are used by other parts (Aristotle calls these 
parts ‘instrumental’): these parts come to be last (GA II 6, 742a16-b18).
The underlying teleological idea of this three-fold division in the 
chronology of the coming to be of parts is that nature does not produce 
parts before the animal is actually able to use them (otherwise, these 
parts would be in vain; see the analogy with the fl ute-player in GA II 
6, 742a26-8), conjoined with the fact that parts that are of the nature of 
an origin necessarily come to be fi rst. With this method in hand (GA 
II 742b10-11: kaitoi kata tautên methodon dei zêtein ti gignetai meta ti), Ar-
istotle is now able to state that the heart comes to be fi rst (as it is the 
principle of motion),42 then the upper half of the body, and fi nally the 
lower parts (GA II 6, 742a36-b18; with the formation of the eye being 
the only observed anomaly: GA II 6, 743b32-4b11). In the remainder of 
GA II 6, Aristotle further specifi es this picture, while being careful to 
distinguish source from end, and instrumental parts from parts that are 
themselves an end.43
42 Cf. GA II 6, 742b33-3a1: ‘for the starting point in things that are without motion is 
the “what it is”, in things that come to be there are several [starting points] — dif-
ferent in mode and not all the same — one of which is the origin of motion. And 
therefore all blooded beings receive a heart fi rst, as was said in the beginning; in 
the other beings the analogue to the heart comes to be fi rst.’ 
43 In short, the picture is as follows: from the heart the bloodvessels grow and extend 
throughout the body; from these bloodvessels the other parts grow, starting with 
the upper half of the body (with the brain growing fi rst; next the eyes, which, 
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What this discussion in GA II 6 illustrates is that the order of a part 
in generation is closely related to and in part even determined by its 
causal role within the development of the animal: sources of growth 
and motion, which constitute effi cient causes, are prior in generation; 
ends produced by those sources, which constitute fi nal causes, are prior 
in defi nition, but last in generation. Things produced by those sources 
and used by the ends, are themselves ends only in a secondary sense: 
although they are the very last to come to be, they are not prior in defi -
nition. Sorting out the order of consecutive processes within a devel-
opment helps sorting out the causal relations between those processes 
(and vice versa), and knowledge of these causal relations is a necessary 
condition for the construction of scientifi c demonstrations.
In sum, even though Aristotle never provides any full-fl edged syl-
logistic demonstrations in his biological works, it seems that at least 
the mode of inference and the concern for tracking order in generation 
are driven by his analysis of demonstrations of same type processes in 
APo II 12.
4  Conclusion
In this paper I have sought to show how Aristotle in both his theory 
and practice of the biological sciences is infl uenced by the two models 
of demonstration of processes outlined in APo II 12.
The fi rst model pertains to causes and effects that come about si-
multaneously and seems particularly fi t for the incorporation of natu-
ral processes that are entirely due to material-effi cient causation. The 
examples of demonstrations of the coming to be of eclipses and of ice 
are formally the same as many of the explanations of the coming to be 
of ‘attributes by which parts of animals differ’ discussed in Generation 
of Animals Book V, except, of course, that the latter are never actually 
presented in a formalized manner. The second model pertains to causes 
and effects that come to be consecutively in a linear causal chain and 
that are of the same type, i.e., that are all past, present, or future hap-
penings. This model appears to be particularly well suited for the incor-
however, do not come to completion until the very end of the embryogenesis), 
then the other necessary parts (which coincide with the second category of parts 
mentioned above), and fi nally the instrumental parts (which coincide with the 
thrid category of parts mentioned above).
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poration of teleological processes in scientifi c demonstrations: both the 
mode of inference involved (i.e., reasoning backwards from the actual 
end result to its conditionally necessary antecedents) and the depiction 
of the middle term as picking out the immediately necessary anteced-
ent of the effect (i.e., some end holding of some subject) are similar to 
Aristotle’s characterization of the mode of demonstration that is special 
to the natural sciences in Parts of Animals Book I. In addition, Aristotle’s 
efforts to determine the chronological order of the coming to be of parts 
of animals in PA II 1 and GA II 6 seem to be infl uenced by his concern 
for discovering immediate premises as expressed in APo II 12.
None of my claims in this paper come close to settling the question 
of the relationship between Aristotle’s scientifi c theory and practice, 
but at least I hope to have shown that the account of demonstration in 
the Posterior Analytics is richer than has often been assumed and that it 
already contains the seeds for a more developed account of demonstra-
tion in the natural sciences as is presented in Parts of Animals Book I. 
Aristotle does not present a monolithic, purely geometric-style model 
of demonstration in the Posterior Analytics, but from the beginning he 
opens up the possibility that there are demonstrations of processes with 
their own mode of inference, necessity, and syllogistic structure.
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